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I. INTRODUCTION
T O THE UNINITIATED, "Free Flight" may merely sound like
another airline pricing scheme. It is, however, actually a
goal that envisions a complete overhaul of the national and in-
ternational air transportation system. In essence, free flight
would shake aviation free from shackles imposed by decades of
increasingly earth-bound control over the airspace users-con-
trol that was made necessary by the terrestrial nature of the lim-
ited technology available at an earlier time.
Free flight recognizes that technological advancements in
communication, navigation, and surveillance systems have oc-
curred that enable vastly improved information availability to
those involved in flight operations-including pilots, air traffic
service providers, planners, dispatchers, and others. Free flight
would return many of the decisions currently made by ground-
based controllers to the aviation users themselves, transforming
the nature of ground based personnel duties from Air Traffic
Control (ATC) to Air Traffic Management (ATM). Impositions
on the flexibility of the pilot would "only be necessary when (1)
potential maneuvers may interfere with other aircraft opera-
tions, (2) traffic density at busy airports or in congested airspace
precludes free flight operations, (3) unauthorized entry of a
special use airspace is imminent or (4) safety of flight restric-
tions are considered necessary."1
The return of some responsibilities to pilots will, in turn, free
the ground-based air traffic service providers from the routine
separation chores that currently occupy a disproportionately
large percentage of their time and allow them to focus on larger
FINAL REPORT OF RTCA TASK FORCE 3: FREE FLIGHT IMPLEMENTATION 25
(RTCA, Inc. ed., 1995) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 3 REPORT].
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scale traffic flow management. The result would be an increase
in freedom, efficiency, economy, and safety.
The beneficiaries of free flight cut across the fabric of avia-
tion. To the airlines, free flight represents efficiency advantages
that result in significant savings of time and money. In a modest
prelude to free flight, American Airlines has demonstrated sav-
ings of $2.2 million per year through the simple use of wind
routes negotiated with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) .2 These savings just scratch the surface of the potential
economic benefits of free flight. Currently, delays along an air-
craft's journey from departure gate to arrival gate may amount
to a cumulative cost to the industry of $3.5 billion per year.'
Free flight has the potential to reduce these delays significantly,
resulting in monumental cost savings to the airlines and their
passengers.
Other factions of the aviation industry are also excited about
the possible benefits of free flight. To general aviation users,
free flight would enhance the flexibility and efficiency enjoyed
in the current system and protect against future encroachment
on that flexibility.' To the government and the maintainers of
the air transportation infrastructure, free flight would represent
significant cost savings by removing the need to maintain costly
terrestrial-based Navigation Aids (navaids) .5 To the flying pub-
lic free flight should present the probability of substantial safety
2 Id. at 92; see also Bruce D. Nordwall, Road Map Leads FAA to "Free Flight", AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 6, 1995, at 34 (also noting annual fuel savings
estimated by Delta of $16.8 million based on freedom to optimize aircraft route,
speed, and altitude).
s TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 (citing Air Transportation Associa-
tion's (ATA) estimate of delays due to air traffic control inefficiencies). The cost
savings for a change from the preferred instrument flight rule (IFR) route struc-
ture that was in existence in 1995 and the routes that users would optimally have
taken amounted to $1.28 billion. Id. at 5 (citing National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) study, G.J. COULURIS & S. DORSKY, ADVANCED AIR TRANS-
PORTATION TECHNOLOGIES (AATr) POTENTIAL BENEFITS ANALYSIS, NASA-AMES RE-
PORT AATT-95-001 (Sept. 1995)).
4 See generally id. app. F.
5 See id. at 5 (noting "indirect benefits to the provider in view of shrinking
government budgets, and the ability to supply more services with fewer re-
sources"); FAA Awards Contract to Develop and Install Satellite Navigation System, U.S.
Dep't of Transp. News Release, Aug. 3, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL
459310 (noting eventual benefit to taxpayers from decommissioning ground-
based navigation systems); Catherine Fahy, MIT Tracks Planes with GPS-Squitter,
MASS. HIGH TECH., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1 (comparing cost of one ground radar
station at $4 to $5 million with cost of comparable ground-based surveillance
system that does not require radar at $50,000 to $100,000).
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benefits, due to the "improved navigation capability, faster and
more reliable communication and an improved approach to
surveillance and separation."6
This Comment explores free flight. It begins by developing
an understanding of the basic concept of free flight. Then, it
reviews the recent technological advances that make the gradual
transition to free flight possible. A discussion of the legal frame-
work forming the boundaries of the transition to free flight fol-
lows, leading to a discussion of legal issues to determine what
obstacles the law poses to the transition to free flight. Institu-
tional issues are then explored since they play such a large role
in the future of free flight.
II. FREE FLIGHT: THE ALPHA AND THE OMEGA OF
AIR TRANSPORTATION
The concept of free flight is not easily defined and its ramifi-
cations are not easily understood. One way to understand the
concept of free flight and its inherent advantages is to compare
the movement of aircraft toward an airport to an attempt to
move a room full of people out of a single door.7 Imagine one
person in the room, designated the "controller," who stands on
a table. Everyone else represents aircraft trying to reach the air-
field. Like the aircraft operating in today's airspace, those peo-
ple are effectively unaware of others around them, so all of the
It should be noted that the benefits of free flight may not be as significant in
countries where there is less air traffic and less controlled airspace-some ques-
tions whether the benefits outweigh the costs in these countries. See Australian
Cites Pitfalls in Pushing New Technologies, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 27,
1997, at 580 (noting that free flight may offer little benefit in Australia and sug-
gesting that airspace modernization should be tailored to the needs of the indi-
vidual country rather than being solved by one worldwide standard).
6 Nordwall, supra note 2, at 34. While there is substantial support for the belief
that free flight will enhance the safety of the National Airspace (NAS), a distinct
minority are not convinced. See, e.g., Alfonso Chardy, Future of Air Travel May Ride
on "Free flight": Pilots to Determine Routes, Altitudes, Speeds, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 21,
1995, at A16 (quoting "serious safety concerns" of Andrew Cantwell, president of
Miami chapter of National Air Traffic Controllers Association).
Further free flight is not a panacea to all aviation problems. David Hinson, the
former Administrator of the FAA, points out that the biggest constraint to effi-
cient aircraft movement through our national airspace may ultimately be the ca-
pacity of our airports. Hinson Says FAA Reform Within Reach, AVIATION DAILY,
Jan. 23, 1997, at 127 (quoting David Hinson speaking to the Aero Club of Wash-
ington). The benefits of increased efficiency in aircraft travel between airports
may be minimized if the takeoffs and landings are themselves gridlocked. Id.
7 This analogy is used by Captain Bill Cotton, United Airlines Air Traffic and
Flight Systems.
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"aircraft" must close their eyes during the evolution. Only the
controller can see everyone. He must then direct people out of
the room, without allowing them to bump into each other or
into a wall. Presumably he will pick out one individual and give
him directions, such as: "Turn left and go forward three steps."
While working with that one person, the others in the room
would be unable to show any initiative to maneuver to maintain
separation from each other, since they are effectively blinded to
any other person's position.
This analogy shows just how good air traffic controllers are
today, given the responsibilities imposed on them as sole keep-
ers of all of the air traffic information under the limitations im-
posed by the current system. More importantly, however, it
highlights just how imposing those limitations are. Under free
flight, everyone in our mythical room could open their eyes. Pi-
lots could then contribute to the safe and efficient movement
towards the door by taking the first steps to avoid interference
with each other. The controller, now that the aircraft are assum-
ing some responsibility for their separation, is freed from devot-
ing so much time to giving detailed, routine instructions. The
controller can now focus not only on providing a redundant
safety backup to the aircraft, but also on larger scale issues, such
as the effect of one sector on other sectors. The result is in-
creased efficiency, with no sacrifice in safety.
One organization involved in the planning necessary to imple-
ment free flight is RTCA, Inc.," formerly known as the Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics. 9 RTCA is a Federal Ad-
visory Committee that "develops consensus based recommenda-
tions on contemporary aviation issues."10  The FAA
Administrator charged RTCA to "form a new task force, led by
an appropriate representative from the civilian aviation commu-
nity, to develop consensus regarding free flight implementa-
tion."1 This RTCA Task Force released its final report in
October 1995, including its recommendations to implement
free flight.12 RTCA defines free flight as follows:
8 RTCA, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation formed for the benefit of the public
through the advancement of aviation. TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
9 Les Blattner, Free Flight: The Possible Dream, AIR LINE PILOT, Jan. 1996, at 33.
10 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at foreword.
11 Id. at 15. In addition to the cited Task Force 3 Report, a "white paper" was
submitted to the FAA by a select committee chaired by L. Lane Speck, Director,
FAA Air Traffic Rules and Procedures Service. Id.
12 See generally id. (including 46 recommendations).
1997] 875
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
[A] safe and efficient flight operating capability under instru-
ment flight rules (IFR) in which the operators have the freedom
to select their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions
are only imposed to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding
airport capacity, to prevent unauthorized flight through Special
Use Airspace (SUA), and to ensure safety of flight. Restrictions
are limited in extent and duration to correct the identified prob-
lem. Any activity which removes restrictions represents a move
toward free flight.1"
Free flight consists of many subcomponents, each of which
may spawn its own unique advantages and benefits to air trans-
portation. The realization of the advantages of all these sub-
components taken to the full extent is a concept becoming
known as "mature free flight."14 Mature free flight may actually
be a utopian ideal, unobtainable in its purest form. Practical
free flight will always be constrained by some factors. Yet, the
subcomponents share the common attribute of each being ben-
eficial in its own right. Each will, to some extent, increase for
the user, "the flexibility to fly where, when and how operating
efficiency, safety and capacity dictate."15 Each of these subcom-
ponents contributes to what will be an "incremental evolution to
'Free Flight."" 6 Together, they will have the synergistic effect of
multiplying the efficiencies that each could independently bring
to the flow of air traffic.
Mature free flight represents the ends of progress in three
phases.1 7 These three phases are in keeping with the approach
to modernization emphasized by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), which has adopted the acronym of CNS/
ATM-highlighting the transition of the three phases of com-
munication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS), in conjunction
with the accompanying transition to ATM.18 Communications
will move from the current emphasis on voice communication
13 Id. at 23.
14 See id.
15 Id. at 13.
16 Id. at 8.
17 As RTCA describes, "the triad of technology capabilities referred to as
CNS-for communications, navigation and surveillance-provide a transition to
a new air traffic management (ATM) system." Id. at 23. It should be noted that a
fourth area will be necessary for the full implementation of free flight-advanced
decision support equipment for dealing with air traffic. Id. at 2.
18 See Vladimir D. Zubkov, Introduction of CNS/ATM-Global Perspective (An
ICAO View) (Nov. 16, 1995) (unpublished outline of presentation, on file with
the author).
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to the use of data link as the primary means. 19 The navigation
will shift from reliance on ground-based navigation aids, such as
very high frequency omnidirectional ranges (VOR), standard
distance measuring equipment (DME), and instrument landing
systems (ILS), to the use of the space-based Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) .20 The surveillance aspect will shift
from the current dependance on terrestrial radar to an Auto-
matic Dependent Surveillance System (ADS) .21 The accompa-
nying concept of ATM is typified by the belief that "[o] nly under
circumstances of severe capacity limitations or to prevent separa-
tion violations would ATM intervene with the aircraft's flight."2 2
Before examining the legal issues involved, it is important to
understand the recent and ongoing technological changes that
will enable the transition to free flight. We will start with a dis-
cussion of the limitations from which these technologies will
free us.
A. THE OLD WAY
The current air transportation system is easily saturated with
air traffic at numerous choke-points. The resulting delays ripple
through the system. These delays result from deficiencies in
each phase of CNS. Our existing system has been described as a
"rather rigid and largely procedural, analog, and ground-based
system comprising HF/VHF-voice communications, terrestrial-
based navigation systems, radar surveillance, and limited air traf-
fic decision support."2 We will examine the limitations im-
posed by each of these technological areas.
1. Communication: VHF/HF24
In looking first at the existing technology of the communica-
tion phase, we see that the current airspace system is served pri-
marily by two-way voice communications. In today's system,
each sequential step of an IFR operation, from the taxi instruc-
tions out of the gate at the departure airport, to the clearance to
19 TASK FoRcE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 13.
23 Id. at 2.
24 See generally FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS AND AERONAUTICAL
INFORMATION MANuAL ch. 4, § 2 (ASA 1996) [hereinafter AIM] (discussing
communication system currently in use for pilot-controller radio communication
phraseology and techniques).
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taxi to the gate at the destination airport, requires a clearance.
Virtually all of these clearances are given via two-way radio com-
munication between an air traffic controller and a pilot. These
communications take place predominantly on a very high fre-
quency (VHF) radio over domestic portions of routes, and on
high frequency (HF) radio for oceanic portions or where line-
of-sight communication is not feasible.
This current reliance on voice communication for practically
all exchanges of information imposes serious limitations on the
system. First, limitations are imposed by the difficulties inherent
in the time-consuming process of two-way voice communication
via radio.2 5 This time-consuming process increases the workload
on controllers, limiting the number of aircraft that a controller
may handle at a given time. Inefficient time lags in the ability of
pilots to maneuver when weather or other factors suggest altera-
tions of flight paths are also imposed by this process.
25 Consider the difficulties that may occur with even a simple clearance to
change an aircraft's altitude. First, the controller must contact the aircraft and
issue the new altitude. Hopefully, the pilot picked out this one important com-
munication from among the continuous stream of communications between the
controller and all the other aircraft on the frequency. If not, a time-consuming
pause follows, which is then followed by a renewed communication attempt by
the controller in a tone of voice intended to draw the attention of the appropri-
ate aircraft. Assuming the aircraft now hears the clearance, he will repeat it back.
Hopefully, what he repeats back will be what the controller intended the aircraft
to hear. If not, and if the controller hears the pilot's erroneous readback, the
process must be repeated in an attempt to ensure that the proper altitude was
spoken and heard. Eventually, the pilot will repeat back the correct altitude,
which confirms that both the pilot and the controller are aware of the aircraft's
clearance. Of course, this process assumes that another aircraft, perhaps one
thatjust checked on the frequency, did not attempt to make his obligatory initial
radio call to the controller when he perceived a pause in the conversation. Occa-
sionally, that call is made at the same time as one of the calls between the control-
ler and the aircraft that is given the altitude change. In that case, the two
simultaneous users of the frequency are oblivious to each other's concurrent use
of the system. Of course, everyone else on the frequency is aware of the situation
since an attempt by two people to communicate simultaneously on the radio fre-
quency results in a loud squeal or buzzing rather than a human voice. Generally,
one of these independent aircraft will be the first to figure out what happened
and will announce on the now quiet radio frequency (since all the parties who
were talking are now waiting for a response): "Blockedl" The process will begin
again from scratch, with neither the controller's attempt at issuing a clearance
nor the newly arrived aircraft's attempt to check on having been successful.
These difficulties are daily occurrences that result even when professional con-
trollers and professional pilots attempt to use the system of two-way voice commu-
nication necessary in the current system.
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Additionally, VHF communications are limited to line-of-
sight. While this may not impose a limit in the domestic air-
space, where the controller work load is likely to be limited by
the number of aircraft one controller can effectively communi-
cate with, this line-of-sight limitation may be a factor as aircraft
transition to overwater navigation.
One further limitation imposed by voice communications is
the language difficulties that often arise in the world of interna-
tional aviation.26 Although English is the international language
of aviation, dialects and accents make reliance on the vocaliza-
tion of the language all the more difficult. In-addition to the
obvious safety problems potentially raised by these communica-
tion barriers, 27 these problems only add to the quantity of trans-
missions on the already overloaded voice channels.28
2. Navigation: Ground-Based Navaids
To an even greater extent than with communications, the cur-
rent navaids impose severe limitations on our use of the air-
space. Currently, most air transportation routes are based on a
system of ground-based navigation equipment.2 9 As a result, the
primary routes followed by aircraft are similar to the roads
driven by cars in that they often take circuitous paths. In the
context of automobiles, this circuitous path is the natural result
of obstacles imposed by either physical or economic constraints.
Aviation routes are not similarly constrained and lend them-
selves naturally to the most direct route possible. Unfortunately,
the dependence on an earth-based system of navaids to form the
26 Michael Skapinker, This Way for Fine Weather: Satellite Technology Will Soon
Transform Aircraft Navigation, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at 22.
27 Experts conjecture that language difficulties, caused by the reliance on voice
communications, were involved in the recent crash of American Airlines Flight
965 near Cali, Columbia. SeeJohn Ritter, Cleared for Disaster; Poor Fluency in English
Means Mixed Signals, USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1996, at IA (also citing at least three
other accidents where improper terminology and language problems have been
cited as possible contributory factors).
28 Cf Skapinker, supra note 26, at 22 (noting the general problem with over-
loaded voice channels).
29 See generally AIM, supra note 24, at ch. 1 (discussing navigation aids). The
primary navaids used for defining routes are VHF omnidirectional ranges
(VORs) and nondirectional radio beacons (NDBs). Id. It should be noted that
inertials, loran, OMEGA, and other methods provide fixing information that is
global in nature (latitudes and longitudes). Most route structures over land,
however, are not predicated on their use, and the routes continue to be driven by
earth-bound navaids.
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beginning and ends of these routes has led to a route structure
that is often anything but direct.
3. Surveillance: Radar
The current means of surveillance relies heavily on ground-
based radar to determine what an aircraft is doing, imposing
further limitations on the system. First, the information is
presented only to the controller. The aircraft and its pilots are
unaware of any radar contacts indicating other aircraft in their
vicinity. As noted earlier, this limitation was at the heart of the
transition from aircraft self-control to vesting responsibility for
separation of aircraft in the ground-based controller.
Second, radar provides only limited information, even to the
controller. For instance, given radar information alone, the
controller is aware only of instantaneous position. Unenhanced
radar does not show the aircraft's altitude, the pilot's current
intentions, or the pilot's desires. The current system imposes
the need for the controller to use other means to become aware
of factors that allow for future planning. Primarily, controllers
rely on the clearance previously issued to the aircraft. Pilots may
not normally deviate from that clearance without going through
the process of getting an amended clearance."0 Of course, in
the dynamic world of aviation, weather and other unforeseen
factors routinely create a desire to deviate from that previous
clearance for safety and efficiency reasons. Two-way voice com-
munications are necessary to determine and relay the current
intentions and desires of the pilots to the controller in hopes of
getting approval for deviation from the clearance. Surveillance
limitations, therefore, impose further burdens on communica-
tions, which are themselves the cause of limitations to the
system.
In sum, this arcane means of aircraft surveillance using radar
to the virtual exclusion of all other means, constrains the air-
craft to controller-issued clearances and precludes deviation
from those clearances absent two-way voice communication.
These limitations stem from the fact that pilots, under the cur-
rent system, are blindly unaware of the specifics of any other
30 Id. para. 4-4-9.a ("When air traffic clearance has been obtained under either
Visual or Instrument Flight Rules, the pilot-in-command of the aircraft shall not
deviate from the provisions thereof unless an amended clearance is obtained.").
31 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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aircraft in their vicinity and are forced to abdicate their share of
the responsibility for aircraft separation. 32
The weakness of the current surveillance system is evident,
and some refinements have already been incorporated. Most
important is the transponder, used to "increase the capability of
radar."3 3 The transponder is aboard the aircraft and enhances
the use of radar by increasing the chances of an aircraft being
seen by radar 4 and by passing aircraft altitude information to
the controller.3 5 Hence, the transponder increases the surveil-
lance information supplied to the controller. It does not, how-
ever, provide any useful information to the pilot. The lack of
information to the pilot remains a serious limitation under our
present system.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Essential to understanding the legal implications of free flight
is an understanding of the technology that led to its possibility.
Each of these advances may independently contribute to the
evolution toward free flight. At the forefront of the technology
that enables transition to free flight are improvements in naviga-
tion made possible by satellite navigation.
1. Navigation: The Global Navigation Satellite System
Several governments, recognizing the value of a satellite-
based, global navigation system, are attempting to create global
navigation signals. The major U.S. contribution is the Global
Positioning System (GPS) .36 To understand the nature of satel-
lite navigation, we will examine the details of U.S. GPS
technology.
32 Despite its limitations, radar admittedly offers an important advantage since
it is capable of operating independently of any aircraft systems. This advantage
willjustify the continued use of radar even after the transition to free flight since
its independent nature provides data that will amplify other information and si-
multaneously provide a redundant backup.
33 AIM, supra note 24, para. 4-1-19.a.1.
4 Id.
35 Id. para. 4-1-19.c.
36 The Russian counterpart to GPS is Glonass. Glonass Nears Full Operation, Avi-
AnON WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 9, 1995, at 52. Glonass offers the advantage over
GPS of not having the selective availability used by the U.S. system to degrade its
performance. Id. As a result, it offers increased accuracy when both are unaug-
mented. Id. The Europeans have also indicated a desire to provide satellite sig-
nals for navigation use. Id. Technologically, these systems operate similarly. Id.
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GPS receivers supply users with an accurate three-dimensional
position.3 7 GPS is based on the signals generated by a twenty-
four satellite constellation of transmitters38 orbiting at an alti-
tude of 10,900 nautical miles (NM) .3 The constellation is ar-
ranged so that the signals from five satellites may be received
from any point on earth at any given time.4 °
The GPS receivers aboard aircraft use accurate internal clocks
to measure the time varying signals received from the selected
satellites. 41 By comparing the incoming signal to a stored copy
of the code, a receiver can derive the time delay between the
transmission of the signal by the satellite and the receipt by the
GPS receiver.42 The GPS receiver calculates the time difference
to determine a pseudo-range from the satellite.43 The GPS re-
ceiver then takes the pseudo-ranges from three satellites and
combines them with information from each of the satellites'
known positions." Use of this information from the three satel-
lites,45 processed through triangulation, 6 allows the GPS re-
ceiver to determine an accurate position. Unlike normal
navaids, the position provided by GPS is a three-dimensional po-
sition, providing altitude as well as latitude and longitude.
The system's accuracy may be varied by the service provider-
the Department of Defense (DOD). The precise positioning
service (PPS) provides the most accurate position, but its use is
limited to "authorized U.S. and allied military, federal govern-
ment, and civil users who can satisfy specific U.S. require-
37 AIM, supra note 24, para. 1-1-22.a.
38 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE & U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 1994 FEDERAL RADIONAVIGA-
TIONPLAN 3-30 to 31 [hereinafter FRP]. The Federal Radionavigation Plan is
"[t] he official source of radionavigation policy and planning for the Federal Gov-
ernment." Id. at xiii.
39 Id. at A-34.
40 AIM, supra note 24, para. 1-1-22.a.7.
41 Id. para. 1-1-22.a.3.
42 Id. para. 1-1-22.a.4.
43 Id.
- Id. The satellite's known position is one of the pieces of information broad-
cast by the satellite. Id.
45 These three required satellites, along with a fourth for timing corrections,
constitutes the minimum satellites a GPS receiver must have to generate its three-
dimensional position. Id. para. 1-1-22.a.8. More than four satellites may be nec-
essary to verify the integrity of the signals or to isolate corrupt signals. Id.
46 In some ways, nothing is new. Triangulation is essentially the same method
of fixing that has always been used with celestial bodies. Andrew Rozmiarek,
Global Positioning System: The New North Star, WIRED, Oct. 1995, at 72. However,
the decimal points of the resulting position have moved a few places.
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ments."47 The standard positioning service (SPS), which is less
accurate than PPS, provides a horizontal accuracy of 100 meters
with a 95% probability and an accuracy of 300 meters with a
99.99% probability.48 While the PPS's use is limited, the SPS is
available to "all users on a continuous worldwide basis, for the
foreseeable future, free of any direct user charge."49 Unfortu-
nately, the accuracy of the SPS is not sufficient for certain appli-
cations. 50 Fortunately, SPS inaccuracies may be minimized by
additional technology that provides augmentation of the GPS
signal.
The basic methods for augmenting GPS accuracy are referred
to as "survey GPS" and "differential GPS" (DGPS) .51 Of most
concern to aviation is the differential GPS system. Under that
system, a land-based receiver station uses its precise known posi-
tion to determine the error in each satellite's data and then
passes that information on to any other receivers in the area.52
The differential system being touted by the FAA to provide
improved accuracy nationally is the wide area augmentation sys-
tem (WAAS) .5  As envisioned, WAAS would supply thirty-five
ground stations across the U.S.54 to provide the differential cor-
rections necessary to allow for Category (CAT) I precision ap-
47 AIM, supra note 24, para. 1-1-22.a.2. The accuracy of the military's uncor-
rupted signal may be as accurate as three meters. Rozmiarek, supra note 46, at
72.
48 AIM, supra note 24, para. 1-1-22.a.2.
49 FRP, supra note 38, at 1-10.
50 In addition to the deliberately increased inaccuracy inherent in SPS, there
may be additional minor errors in the accuracy of the system due to several
sources. These sources include "an ionospheric delay, and time disparities be-
tween the atomic clocks in the satellites and the GPS receiver." AIM, supra note
24, para. 1-1-22.a.4. In addition to the required three satellites for resolution of
the receiver's position, measurements from a fourth satellite are used to factor
out time errors induced by the inaccuracies of the quartz clocks in the receivers.
Rozmiarek, supra note 46, at 72.
51 "Survey GPS" results in millimeter accuracy by using the doppler shift result-
ing from the raw data from the satellite. Rozmiarek, supra note 46, at 72. Along
with an increase in accuracy, however, comes a slow down in the real time re-
sponse due to the increased number of computations. Id. As a result, it is less
practical than differential GPS augmentation for use in aviation.
52 Id.
53 News Breaks, AVIATION WiL & SPACE TECH., Aug. 7, 1995, at 17. The Depart-
ment of Transportation and the FAA recently announced the awarding of the
WAAS contract to an industry team led by Wilcox Electric, in partnership with
Hughes Aircraft and TRW. FAA Awards Contract to Develop and Install Satellite Navi-
gation System, supra note 5.
54 News Breaks, supra note 53, at 17.
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proaches based on the improved accuracy.55 Additionally, local
area augmentation systems (LAAS) 56 may be used to improve
further the accuracy and integrity of the signal necessary for
CAT III landings."
Currently, the FAA has approved the use of GPS as a primary
means of navigation for all U.S. civil operators "in oceanic air-
space and certain remote areas." 58 GPS may also be supple-
mentally used for IFR navigation for domestic en route
segments, for terminal operations, and for certain instrument
approach procedures (IAPs). 1 This is part of an ongoing pro-
gram by the FAA integrating the use of GPS within the National
Air System (NAS). 60
2. Communication: Data Link and Satellite
Just as in the navigation realm, the technology for communi-
cations between the aircraft and the ground has progressed to a
point that allows fundamental changes in the nature of commu-
nication. Methods for communicating information between
ground and aircraft are midway through an evolution that will
vastly enhance the efficient communication of vital information.
Instead of relying on the sole use of two-way voice communica-
tion, the system will move towards an increased reliance on the
55 Marc E. Cook, On the Satellite Express, AOPA PILOT, Dec. 1995, at 87.
56 Also referred to as local area differential (GPS/LADGPS). See generally FRP,
supra note 38, at D-7.
57 Victor Wullschleger, FAA Demonstrates GPS Category III Landing Is Feasible,
SATNAV NEws, Dec. 1995, at 2. The initial flight testing of a GPS autoland to CAT
III standards involved a NASA Boeing 757 and took place July 19, 1995. NASA
Ries First Cat IXI GPS Autoland, AIR LINE PILOT, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 55. Testing by
Daimler-Benz has also indicated the potential for CAT III approaches that would
provide continuous information even if the GPS failed for up to 30 seconds by
combining the signal with an inertial navigation system signal. Researchers Test D-
GPS Approaches, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 9, 1995, at 57.
58 AIM, supra note 24, para. 1-1-22.a.9.
59 Id.
60 See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., GPS IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN FOR AIR NAVIGATION AND LANDING 1 (1994) [hereinafter GPS IMPLEMENTA-
TION PLAN]. For instance, GPS is being phased in for use in instrument ap-
proaches under IFR conditions through a three phase program. AIM, supra note
24, para. 1-1-22.d. Phase I requires active monitoring of the ground-based naviga-
tion aid, Phase II requires that the ground based navigation aid be installed, but
not necessarily turned on, and Phase III (the approach is retitled as a "GPS"
approach) imposes no need for any ground-based navigation aids to be turned
on or even installed. Id. These three phases are also referred to as the "multisen-
sor" phase, the "supplemental" phase, and the "primary" phase. GPS IMPLEMEN-
TATION PLAN, supra, at 1.
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data linking of digital information between those on the ground
and those in the aircraft for the transmission of routine
information.
The rudimentary beginnings of this transition are already in
place. Currently, the Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) is a data link system being used to
provide some pre-departure clearances and oceanic clear-
ances.6 1 ACARS faces further development to allow for the ex-
change of other information, such as automated terminal
information system (ATIS) messages, issuance of taxi clearances,
frequency changes, and hazardous weather information.62
Another cutting edge technology that may further evolve to
incorporate new communications technologies is the Flight
Management System (FMS). Aircraft currently entering the air
transportation industry already incorporate FMS for increased
navigation capability.63 They may be further "expanded to in-
clude two-way data link (TWDL) and automatic dependent sur-
veillance (ADS) capability."64
Ultimately, data link is envisioned as being the primary link
between those involved in ATM.65 "Nonroutine communica-
tions" would still use voice communications, 66 but an ADS-
broadcast (ADS-B) could be used for broadcasting the bulk of
the routine aircraft information. For instance, the broadcast
ADS-B information would include "identification, time, posi-
tion, velocity and other time sensitive surveillance information,"
as well as information about the aircraft's short-term inten-
tions. 6 7 Additionally, the aircraft would receive the same infor-
mation "from proximate aircraft."6
Further advances in communication may be available through
the assistance of satellite links. Satellite data links are currently
being used to provide some communication in remote areas
where line-of-sight VHF radio and radar are unavailable.69 As
61 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 99.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 98; see, e.g., Boeing Announces Selection of Smiths Industries Flight Manage-
ment Computed Systems, CNS OUTLOOK, Sept. 6, 1995 (noting use of flight manage-
ment computer system incorporating GPS for use in Boeing 737-700 and 737-800
series).
64 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 98.
65 Id. at 99.
66 Id. at 99-100.
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the demand for such equipment grows, aircraft manufacturers
are expanding the usefulness of satellite voice and data commu-
nication (SATCOM) equipment to meet the new demands.7 °
Fortunately, there may be some coherence in the develop-
ment of future communication systems. Much of the communi-
cations technology may be guided by a cooperative agreement
resulting from the collaboration of the FAA with eleven airlines
who have formed an entity known as ATN Systems, Inc.71
Through that group, the FAA will use a "consensus oriented
process to develop system requirements" rather than depending
on the normal FAA acquisition process.72 The end result will be
the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN), which
will utilize the "worldwide standard for aviation
communication."7 3
3. Surveillance Systems: ADS
As in the navigation and communication regime, the technol-
ogy that will allow free flight is already being implemented to
provide surveillance enhancements. Already in place, the Traf-
fic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is an example
of the advantages of providing information to pilots regarding
other aircraft in their vicinity.74 TCAS processes the informa-
tion and displays it to the pilot. Additionally, if TCAS detects
the potential for conflict, it may provide a resolution advisory
(RA) that indicates the vertical maneuver that would best avoid
a conflict.75 TCAS, thus, is a model for showing that providing
information to the airspace users and allowing them a greater
role in flight path planning may contribute to both the effi-
ciency and the safety of aircraft operations.
The surveillance system of the future will expand on this con-
cept. Information broadcast by ADS-B will be provided to
70 See, e.g., News Briefs; McDonnell Douglas [MD] and United Airlines [UALJ] Plan
this Month to Begin Testing the Cockpit Weather Information Needs (CWIN) System, AIR
SAFETY WK., Sept. 4, 1995, at 7 (noting testing of cockpit weather information
needs CWIN system for United Airlines).
71 Industry Perspective of FAA R&D Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tech-
nology of the House Comm. on Science, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement ofJ.
Roger Fleming, Senior Vice President, Operations and Safety, Air Transport As-
soc. of America).
72 Id. at attachment B.
73 Id.
74 AIM, supra note 24, para. 4-4-15.
75 Id. For additional information regarding pilot maneuvers based on TCAS,
see infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
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nearby aircraft as well as to ground ATM personnel. This infor-
mation will be combined with radar data to allow increased ac-
curacy as well as redundancy to accept a failure of either radar
or ADS.76 Pilots will be able to use this information for planning
purposes. Additionally, the information will be reviewed on the
ground by software to "detect potential flight path conflicts and
identify optimized resolution actions." 77 If conflict probe
software determines that a conflict exists, resolution software
would suggest a maneuver to achieve the minimum required
separation through the least disruptive maneuver, taking into
account each aircraft's intentions. 7 Assuming ATM concurs,
the instructions would be passed to the aircraft.79 It is important
to note that these resolution instructions will be designed to
have the minimum impact on the aircraft; often involving only
minor course changes, for instance. This is in keeping with the
free flight concept that any constraints on airspace users should
be imposed only when necessary and only to the degree neces-
sary to resolve potential conflicts. After resolution, the con-
straints would be lifted and the aircraft would again be free in
their choice of flight path.
The value of surveillance technology is not limited to increas-
ing efficiency of airborne aircraft. Technology may allow for in-
corporation of these surveillance techniques to monitor aircraft
position on the ground. Testing is underway on a system that
will use GPS for position information to allow tower personnel
to track up to 500 aircraft and ground vehicles on a display that
would portray each vehicle's position, speed, and direction of
movement.8 0
C. THE BEGINNING OF THE CONTINUUM TO FREE FLIGHT
Technology has slowly made inroads into some limitations the
current system imposes. What makes free flight different from
these small steps is that free flight envisions concurrent progress
in all three phases of CNS, as well as the development of new
decision support technology. Each of these technological
76 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 100.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 101.
79 Id.
80 See Fahy, supra note 5, at 1.
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phases is to some extent independent yet linked to the others.8 s
However, when progress takes place in each of these phases,
there will be additional benefits from the synergistic effect.82
Despite the far reaching nature of the goals of free flight and
the extensive technological advances it envisions, the basic con-
cept itself is not new-after all, Orville and Wilbur Wright re-
quired no clearance to take off at Kitty Hawk. 83 As time went
on, however, the airspace became more crowded, and the air-
craft flew at increased airspeeds. The old method of separation
by "see and avoid," used until the 1950s, became unworkable
since pilots did not have sufficient information regarding fast-
moving nearby aircraft.84 For safety reasons,8 it was necessary to
incorporate ground-based assistance, and hence control, to en-
sure aircraft separation 86 as speeds and congestion increased
and particularly as flight in instrument conditions became more
common. Thus, the ground-based control in our system
evolved, in part, from the lack of information available to air-
borne pilots and the need for ground-based assistance.
Technology has progressed, however. It has reached a point
where additional information can be displayed to pilots, en-
abling them to take on some of the responsibility for separation
of aircraft. Free flight merely returns responsibility and control
to the airspace users when they are provided the means for
safely making the appropriate decisions.
81 For instance, GPS makes increased precision in navigation possible, and
WAAS will allow Cat I approaches to be flown whether or not the technological
advances through data link surveillance reporting are available. See id.
82 See generally Bruce D. Nordwall, Users Want More Clout in ATC Upgrade Deci-
sions, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 2, 1995, at 38. For instance, the use of a
data link to transmit position will allow for decreased separation standards, re-
gardless of the type of fixing information used, simply because of the informa-
tion's timeliness. If, on the other hand, GPS position is used, the separation
standards could be further decreased because of the accuracy of the position. See
TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-29 (noting that the size of the "pro-
tected zone" around aircraft is dependent on the accuracy of position determina-
tion). In either case, there will be the additional benefit of decreased use of two-
way voice communication, decreasing chances of errors in communication or air-
waves congestion.
83 ATC System Biggest Drag on Airline Productivity, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
July 31, 1995, at 51 [hereinafter ATC System].
84 Id.
85 Id. "[A]viation grudgingly sacrificed operational flexibility for safety." Id.
86 As it evolved, the existing system yields fixed navigation routes that provide a
minimum horizontal separation of five nautical miles and a minimum vertical
separation of either 1000 or 2000 feet, depending on the aircraft altitude. TASK
FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
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This transfer of responsibility for aircraft separation back to
the cockpit may not be as innovative a concept as it seems. Mod-
els for returning increased responsibility for aircraft separation
into the cockpit exist in our current system. For instance, the
concept that the aircraft commander of a state-operated aircraft
assumes responsibility for the separation of his aircraft from all
other aircraft is accepted both domestically 7 and internation-
ally."" Further, under visual flight rules (VFR), all pilots are
given the responsibility to see and avoid as the predominant
method for separation of aircraft."9 Even under instrument
flight rules (IFR), when ground-based controllers have the pri-
mary burden for separation of aircraft, this duty to see and avoid
is imposed on pilots when weather conditions permit.90 Com-
mercial aircraft routinely accept some responsibility for separa-
tion on an IFR clearance when executing a visual approach.9 1
When a controller directs a pilot to "maintain visual separation"
in a terminal area, ATC is relying on the aircraft to provide its
own separation.92
TCAS indicates that pilot responsibility for separation is tech-
nically achievable. It also demonstrates that a shared responsi-
bility for separation of aircraft between the ATS provider and
the pilot can increase the overall safety and efficiency of the sys-
tem. TCAS may thus provide a model for the fluid shift of re-
sponsibility for separation to the pilot, and is, therefore, worth
exploring in further detail.
87 See AIM, supra note 24, at Pilot/Controller Glossary, "Due Regard."
88 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 3(d), 61 Stat.
1180, 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. 296, 298 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] ("The con-
tracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that
they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.").
89 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (1996) (imposing responsibility on each person
operating an aircraft when weather conditions permit); see also AIM, supra note
24, para. 5-5-8.a. ("When meteorological conditions permit .... the pilot is re-
sponsible to see and avoid other traffic, terrain, or obstacles.").
90 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b). 'When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether
an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules . Id.
(emphasis added).
91 SeeAIM, supra note 24, paras. 4-4-13, 5-4-20.d (noting that "acceptance of the
visual approach clearance constitutes acceptance of pilot responsibility for main-
taining a safe approach interval").
92 Id. para. 4-4-13. In that case, acknowledgement of the instructions is ac-
knowledgement not only that the pilot will maneuver the aircraft as necessary to
maintain separation from the aircraft, but also "that the pilot accepts responsibil-
ity for wake turbulence separation." Id. para. 4-4-13.b.
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TCAS provides information to the pilot regarding other air-
craft in the vicinity, known as traffic advisories.93 If TCAS
software determines the potential for a conflict exists, it is then
capable of providing recommendations for resolution of these
conflicts by providing a resolution advisory (RA) . Under the
current system, pilots may deviate from an ATC clearance upon
receipt of an RA and notify ATC of that deviation as soon as
practicable. 95 This maneuvering, in turn, removes from ATC
the responsibility of providing standard IFR separation between
aircraft until the aircraft returns to the previously assigned alti-
tude and course or until alternate instructions have been issued
by ATC. 6 TCAS thus returns some decision making to the pilot,
while recognizing that it "does not alter or diminish the pilot's
basic authority and responsibility to ensure safe flight."97
The return of responsibility for separation of aircraft to the
cockpit, therefore, is not without precedent. Likewise, the free
flight goal of giving users increased flexibility over their route
planning is not entirely new. As early as 1979, the FAA envi-
sioned a program of direct routing with fewer restraints. 98 This
program was tested during a six-month program by United, Pan
Am, and Eastern, allowing direct routing between selected city
pairs. 99
Part of the early transition to flexible route planning involved
the use of area navigation (RNAV).10o RNAV allowed for naviga-
tion independent of the route structure imposed by ground-
based navaids. 101 Unfortunately, this advance in navigation ca-
pabilities was not accompanied by a corresponding advance in
"procedures and decision support systems"10 2 on the ground,
thus limiting the usefulness of the concept.
The National Route Program (NRP) represents a recent ex-
periment into flexible route planning.1 0 3 The NRP allows com-
mercial aircraft increased freedom in route planning at higher
93 Id. para. 44-15.
94 Id.95 Id. para. 4-4-15.b.1.
96 Id. paras. 4-4-15.b.3.(a)-(b).
97 Id. para. 4-4-15.d.
98 See Blattner, supra note 9, at 32.
99 Id.
100 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
101 Id.
102 Id.
10S William J. McGee, Getting There Faster and Cheaper, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD,
Sept. 1, 1995, at 46.
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altitudes 10 4 by allowing aircraft that are a sufficient distance
from their departure and arrival points to fly the airline's choice
of routes,105 instead of filing for IFR preferred routes.106 It re-
quires only that pilots file a flight plan, stay on that flight plan,
and maintain contact with ATC, without imposing any further
restrictions.10 7 This relatively simple program is estimated to
save airlines over $40 million per year. 08 Even though the NRP
represents a significant step in the loosening of navigational
constraints, it is only a small step along the same path envi-
sioned by free flight. 09
D. MATURE FREE FLIGHT: FROM HERE TO THE END RESULT
Just as the process until now has been a gradual evolution, the
road to free flight will take place as a continuum of changes.
Domestically, one time line for this continuum has been laid
down by RTCA. Their October 1995 Final Report and August
1996 Action Plan contained forty-six recommendations for mov-
ing to the free flight concept, breaking down the changes into
near-term, mid-term, and far-termn 10 For instance, the expan-
sion of the NRP may be achieved in the near-term."' Other
changes, such as the development of and implementation of
104 Initially the program applied to any aircraft at 39,000 feet or above, but this
altitude has been gradually stepped down. Id.; see also TASK FORCE 3 REPORT,
supra note 1, at 59 (advocating further expansion of the NRP).
105 McGee, supra note 103, at 46.
106 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
107 James Ott, Airlines, General Aviation Weigh Time/Cost Issues, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 41.
108 McGee, supra note 103, at 46.
109 The system is still subject to numerous limitations. See, e.g., AIM, supra note
24, para. 5-1-7.d. 1 ("Random RNAV routes can only be approved in a radar envi-
ronment."); AIM, supra note 24, para. 5-1-7.d.4. (addressing random RNAV
routes for airport-to-airport flight plans only above FL 390).
110 See generally TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1 at 133 (noting the aggressive
projections set down for these time frames indicating 1997 as a goal for near-
term, 1998 through 2000 as a goal for mid-term, and far-term as post 2001); FREE
FLIGHT ACTION PLAN 12-59 (RTCA, Inc. ed., 1996) [hereinafter FREE FLIGHT AC.
TION PLAN].
M1 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 59-60. Task Force 3 recommended
expanding the NRP from its limitation to higher altitudes to as low as flight level
(FL) 290. Id. at 135. Altitudes referenced to a standardized barometric setting
are referred to as flight levels (FL) rather than altitudes, with the final two digits
dropped for simplification. AIM, supra note 24, at Pilot/Controller Glossary,
"Flight Level." Thus, RTCA recommends lowering the NRP in the near-term to
approximately 29,000 feet.
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IAAS to achieve CAT II and III capabilities are not immediately
achievable and are considered far-term goals. 1 2
In the international forum, ICAO's Future Air Navigation Sys-
tems (FANS) committee was formed to plan the transition of the
international air transportation system.11 3 FANS was adopted in
1991 by ICAO as a "key element of the Air Traffic Management
system."' 1
4
III. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As expected with a sweeping concept like free flight, numer-
ous problems may be encountered. Thorny legal issues will be
among the problems, along with significant political and institu-
tional issues. Before proceeding to these issues, it is important
to review the legal framework that will affect this area.
A. LAWS OF OUTER SPACE
Because of the importance of satellite-based navigation to the
concept of free flight, some space law concepts will affect the
implementation of free flight and should be reviewed. Two
treaties are important to exploring the sovereignty and liability
issues.
The Outer Space Treaty of 196715 requires that the use of
outer space be "for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries."116 It further specifies that customary international law ap-
plies in outer space.1 1 7 To accomplish this, it specifies that there
is no sovereignty in outer space."' Article VI provides that the
country bears responsibility for "national activities in outer
space.... whether such activities are carried on by governmen-
tal agencies or by non-governmental entities."" 9 Article VII fur-
112 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 151. The FAA has reached agree-
ment with manufacturers and airlines on the groundwork for the local area aug-
mentation system (LAAS) that will enable precision approaches down to
Category 3 conditions, as well as airport surface navigation. FAA, Industry Reach
Agreement on GPS-Based Landing System, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 20, 1996, at 465.
113 Task Force 3 Report, supra note 1, at 11.
114 Id. at 24.
115 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
116 Id. at 2412-13, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207.
117 Id. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207-08.
118 Id. at 2412-13, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207-08. Article VIII provides for jurisdiction,
even without sovereignty. Id. at 2416, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
119 Id. at 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
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ther provides that the country from whose territory the satellite
was launched "is internationally liable for damages to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or
in outer space. "120
The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects121 gives further guidance on the liabil-
ity issue. The Convention provides that "[a] launching State
shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to air-
craft in flight."122 This Convention will bear heavily on our dis-
cussion of international liability.
B. EXISTING LAWS REGULATING AVIATION
In addition to space law, the relatively earthbound laws of avi-
ation will also affect the implementation of free flight. It is
therefore necessary to examine both the laws governing the in-
ternational aspects of air transportation and the laws governing
the domestic aspects.
1. International Law
The Chicago Convention1 23 forms the basis for the organiza-
tion of international air transportation. It provides that each
"State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory."124 The Convention specifically excludes mil-
itary, customs, and police services from its governance. 125 It also
offers specific requirements for overflight of states. State air-
craft may not fly over another contracting state without
authorization. 126
Scheduled international air service is likewise prohibited from
operating "over or into the territory of a contracting State, ex-
cept with the special permission or other authorization of that
120 Id.
121 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389; 961 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
122 Id. at 2392.
123 Chicago Convention, supra note 88.
124 Id. at 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298. The sovereignty is further extended by de-
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State." 27 For aircraft not engaged in scheduled international
air services, the Convention establishes the right to "make flights
into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops
for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior
"1128permission ....
The Convention also grants each state the right to establish
restricted and prohibited areas, so long as the areas apply to
domestic aircraft from that state as well as international air-
craft. 129 Additionally, the Convention charges each contracting
state with the responsibility of providing radio services and air
navigation facilities'"0 and with the adoption of the standard sys-
tem of communications procedure.1l '
The Chicago Convention charges ICAO with the responsibil-
ity of promoting uniformity to facilitate and improve air naviga-
tion.1 32 To achieve this goal, ICAO is to adopt international
standards for communications systems and air navigation aids,133
as well as rules of the air and air traffic practices.1 3 4
2. Domestic Law
Consistent with the view of sovereignty under the Chicago
Convention, the United States Government has statutorily
claimed exclusive sovereignty over the airspace of the United
States.135 Within that airspace, the Administrator of the FAA is
charged with prescribing air traffic regulations dealing with nav-
igation, the protection of individuals and property on the
ground, the efficient use of the airspace, and the prevention of
collisions involving aircraft. 3 6 With respect to international air
transportation, the Secretary of Transportation and the Admin-
127 Id. at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
128 Id. at 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298.
129 Id. at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 302.
130 Id. at 1188, 15 U.N.T.S. at 314.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1190, 15 U.N.T.S. at 302. For current status of the annexes to the
Chicago Convention, see R.I.R. Abeyratne, The Legal Status of the Chicago Conven-
tion and Its Annexes, 19 AIR & SPACE LAW. 113, 118 (1994).
133 Chicago Convention, supra note 88, at 1190, 15 U.N.T.S. at 302.
134 Id.
135 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (1994).
136 Id. § 40103(b) (2) (A)-(D). The regulations most directly affecting pilots are
the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), which the Administrator of the FAA is
charged to prescribe. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2). Even more specifically, the Ad-
ministrator is charged with the development of "long range plans and policy for
the orderly development and use of the navigable airspace, and the orderly devel-
opment and location of air navigation facilities, that will best meet the needs of,
894
TRANSITION TO FREE FLIGHT
istrator of the FAA are required to "act consistently with obliga-
tions of the United States Government under [any]
international agreement."
137
IV. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
Both legal issues and the institutional issues will be examined.
The legal issues will focus on sovereignty and liability issues.
A. SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES
The transition to free flight raises sovereignty issues in two
ways. First, electromagnetic signals emanating from the naviga-
tional aids will be entering the sovereign airspace of other states.
Second, under free flight concepts aircraft could physically in-
trude upon national airspace without traditional clearances
from air traffic service providers.
As a starting point, treaty provisions frame the basic sover-
eignty principles. The Chicago Convention specifically notes
that the airspace over a state is sovereign, 1 3 although it does not
delineate the upper limit to this sovereignty. By contrast, the
Outer Space Treaty declares that outer space is not sovereign,1 39
but does not delineate the lower limit of this principle. Against
this backdrop of international sovereignty principles, one can
look to the possible intrusion of sovereign airspace.
1. Electromagnetic Intrusion of Sovereign Airspace
"Navigation satellites do not enter the sovereign space of
states; however, the navigation signals that control the naviga-
tion in sovereign space of aircraft, ships and vehicles do enter
sovereign airspace."1 40 Thus framed, the question is whether
the GPS signal itself invades the sovereign territory.
The issue of electromagnetic intrusion of sovereign airspace is
not unique to GPS. The issue has been addressed in other con-
texts, such as direct broadcasting systems (DBS) and other com-
munications systems. Comparing the experience of GPS with
and serve the interests of, civil aeronautics and the national defense." Id.
§ 44501 (a).
1-1 Id. § 40105(b).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
140 Paul B. Larsen, Recent Changes in Space Law's Concept of Sovereignty, in
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 88TH AN-
NUAL MEETING 264, 265 (1994).
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these other systems, it appears that objections have been all but
nonexistent with GPS.141 With DBS, the issue was initially heav-
ily debated.1 42 The result of the debate was a United Nations
(UN) resolution, adopted over United States opposition, 4 '
which imposed tight constraints on states either conducting
DBS broadcasting activities or private companies broadcasting
their own signals. 144 This early "confining" attitude toward
states that allowed the broadcasting of radio signals into other
states did not last. Not only have other technologies, such as
wireless communications, not met this resistance to implementa-
tion, but even DBS appears to have evolved into a smoother, less
contentious existence. 45
One possible reason for the relative ease with which wireless
communication is being introduced may be the international
nature of the controlling companies.1 46 In the case of wireless
communication, Iridium is one of the key players, and it is
jointly owned by companies of three different countries.1 47
Another reason for the minimal sovereignty problems with
wireless communication is that it offers services valuable enough
to offset objections to any negative external influence caused by
the invading radio waves. 148 In the case of DBS, serious objec-
tions were raised, in part, due to the perceived cultural influ-
ence the transmission of the DBS signals could have on the
invaded country.1 49 At the time, the Soviet Union even argued
that prior consent was required before radio or television broad-
casts could be transmitted into a sovereign country.1 50 It was
thought that DBS radio waves would bring mass media influ-
ences into a state and that the "invaded" state should have some
141 Id. at 265-66.
142 Id. at 266. The debate was initially carried on in the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU), but it was constrained to technical issues and unable to
address the political issues involved. Id.
143 Id. (referring to 1982 United Nations Resolution of Principles on the Use of DBS
by States, G.A. Res. 92, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 98, U.N. Doc. A/
37/51 (1983)).
1- Id. at 266. A similar resolution was reached regarding remote sensing as it
relates to the concept of sovereign territory. See id. (referring to U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/370 at 12).
145 Id. at 266-67.
146 Id. at 267.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and International Regulation,
37 VAND. L. REv. 67, 113 (1984).
150 Id.
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control over them. By way of contrast, wireless communication
does not operate in the blanketing way that the DBS broadcast
of radio and television programs does and, hence, does not
carry the same stigma of being an invading cultural influence.
Taken together, the value of wireless communication out-
weighed its negligible destructive influence.
Perhaps GPS has not met serious resistance on sovereignty
grounds for this same reason. GPS, to an even greater extent
than wireless communication, stands to offer so much to the in-
truded upon state, while imposing virtually no objectionable
influences.
Thus far, it appears free flight may ride the coattails of other
technological advances that have pushed the envelope of sover-
eignty rights. There will likely be little additional objection to
the GPS signals on sovereignty grounds, based on the pragmatic
advantages of such a powerful technology that is being offered
free of charge.151
2. Physical Intrusion of Sovereign Airspace
While GPS pushes the boundaries of sovereign airspace
through the emanation of its radio signals, those boundaries are
taken one step further by free flight. Under the current scheme
of international air navigation, aircraft routing is accomplished
only in accordance with a clearance. This clearance ensures the
permission necessary to enter a state under the Chicago Con-
vention.15 2 This may be contrasted with free flight, which envi-
sions aircraft selecting and using their own route of flight
without receiving a traditional clearance.
Under a system of pure free flight, a flight from departure to
destination could involve going over multiple countries with no
warning or consistent pattern. A user would be free to alter his
normal routing to take advantage of unusual winds or other fac-
tors unique to that flight. For many flights, this may not pose a
problem, since they might not involve the crossing of sovereign
boundaries. For other flights, however, this ability to choose the
route may conflict with the Chicago Convention's sovereignty
requirements. For instance, an air carrier could select a route
that, because of an unusually strong jet stream that day, took the
aircraft over countries over which the air carrier did not nor-
151 Larsen, supra note 140, at 320.
152 See Chicago Convention, supra note 88, at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
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mally operate. This sort of flexibility was not designed into the
Chicago Convention.
The onus will be on ICAO to define the means to satisfy the
permission requirements of the Chicago Convention, mindful
of the value of imposing minimum constraints on the basic con-
cept of free flight. While thorny from a legal perspective, this
may not be a formidable task from a practical view.
First, the issue deals only with scheduled air transportation
and would only relegate it to the same status as nonscheduled,
nonstate aircraft. 53 Second, to the extent that the permission
requirement was based on the ability of the ATS providers to
handle the aircraft, free flight offers a corresponding decrease
in the workload of these providers relative to the number of air-
craft in their airspace. Finally, as with the electromagnetic intru-
sion of sovereign territory, free flight offers valuable advantages
that may offset the disadvantages.
As a result of these factors, it will be advantageous for sover-
eign nations to accept some possible increase in intrusions by
transiting scheduled air transportation traffic in return for the
benefits afforded that nation's airlines. The willingness of na-
tions to open their airspace to freedom of air travel is certainly
consistent with the recent worldwide trend of countries loosen-
ing their overflight restrictions. 5 '
B. LIABILITY ISSUES
Free flight also raises concerns regarding the liability of a state
under both international and domestic law. Free flight may also
affect the existing division of liability between pilots and
controllers.
1. International Liability Issues
Because of the use of satellite-based technology for free flight,
the Liability Convention will serve as the starting point for exam-
ining international liability. 155 Under that Convention, it ap-
pears that if a satellite, such as a GPS satellite, caused damage to
an aircraft in flight, the United States, as the launching state,
15 The right of its nonscheduled international air services to transit nonstop
across a state's territory is secured by the Chicago Convention. See id. at 1181, 15
U.N.T.S. at 298.
154 See, e.g., McGee, supra note 103, at 46 (noting the loosening of overfly re-
strictions over both China and the former Soviet Union).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
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would be absolutely liable to pay compensation. 156 Negligence
would not even be required on the part of the United States.
The extent of this liability is not clear. For instance, while the
Liability Convention explicitly defined the types of "damages"
that can be claimed, 157 there is some dispute over whether the
Convention would require compensation for indirect dam-
ages. 158 The Convention made an explicit decision not to ad-
dress the issue of indirect damages, which may indicate that
indirect damages are not covered. 159 This implication has been
noted by some commentators on the subject.6 0 From a prag-
matic view, it is important to note that this is the view espoused
by the United States, which interprets damages as including di-
rect damages resulting from the launch flight and reentry of
space objects, but not from "remote or indirect damage for
which there is only a hypothetical causal connection with a par-
ticular space activity." 16 1
Additional aspects of the Liability Convention serve to limit
liability. First, the Convention provides for exoneration if the
damage is due to "gross negligence or from an act or omission
done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State
or of... persons it represents"1 62 unless such activities were con-
trary to international law.1 63 Additionally, the Convention re-
quires that the claim be made by a state rather than by any
individual seeking compensation. 64 Further, the Liability Con-
vention would not apply to cases where nationals of the launch-
ing state are seeking compensation.1 65
Thus far, we have examined the issue of liability based on
damage caused by the space object. To examine liability based
on damage caused by other means, one must move from space
law to traditional aviation law. It should be noted that under
156 Liability Convention, supra note 121, at 2392, 461 U.N.T.S. at 189.
157 Id.
158 Kevin K. Spradling, GPS and the Law, GPS WORLD, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 48, 50.
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., Van C. Ernest, Note, Third Party Liability of the Private Space Industy:
To Pay What No One Has Paid Before, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 503, 519-20 (1991).
161 Edward F. Hennessey, Liability for Damage by the Accidental Operation of a Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative System, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 317, 335 (1988) (quoting state-
ment of the U.S. representative to the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOUS (June
30, 1971)).
162 Liability Convention, supra note 121, at 2394, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190.
163 Id. at 2394-95, 961 U.N.T.S. at 190-91.
164 Id. at 2395, 961 U.N.T.S. at 191.
165 Id. In this case, the issue of sovereign immunity would be raised.
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space law, a launching country is "both 'responsible' and 'lia-
ble'" for damage caused by satellites launched from its terri-
tory.16 This may be contrasted with aviation law, where "[t] he
United States exercises a supervisory role (responsibility) with
respect to ships and planes owned by the private sector but does
not accept the financial risk (liability) for the actions of these
assets. "167 Thus, the United States would not be liable for ac-
tions of U.S. registered aircraft that cause damage outside of our
country.
2. Liability of the United States
Examination of liability issues involving the United States gov-
ernment requires exploration of the means available to over-
come the traditional sovereign immunity available to individual
governments. Chief among these is the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).' 6 Under the FTCA, the district courts are granted ex-
clusive jurisdiction:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.' 69
This provision is subject to specified tort claims procedures.1 7 0
Among the procedures are numerous exceptions to the jurisdic-
tional grant over claims against the U.S. government. 17 1
The most prominent exception from FTCA jurisdiction is the
exclusion of claims based on the "discretionary function" of a
federal agency or employee of the government. 72 Under the
discretionary function exception, the government will not be lia-
ble where the claim is based on:
an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation.... or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
166 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Space Stations and the Law:
Selected Legal Issues-Background Paper, 20 OTA-BP-ISC-41 (Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, Aug. 1986).
167 Id.
168 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994).
169 Id. § 1346(b).
170 See id. §§ 2671-2680.
171 See generally id. § 2680(a)-(n).
172 Id. § 2680(a).
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perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government.173
This exception to liability has been defined by a series of deci-
sions beginning with the Supreme Court decision in Dalehite v.
United States.74 In that case, the Court declared that the exemp-
tion from liability due to discretionary functions would extend
to "determinations made by executives or administrators in es-
tablishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. "175
The Court went on to say that no claim may be based on the
"acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of govern-
ment in accordance with official directions."1 76
This does not guarantee government immunity for all acts
merely because the decision to undertake those acts was discre-
tionary. Once the government makes the discretionary policy
decision to undertake a service, it is under an obligation to act
reasonably in the operational context of providing that service.
For instance, Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.177 recognized that
the decision to undertake the air traffic control function was dis-
cretionary. 7 8 Nevertheless, the government was found liable for
what the court found was an unreasonable error by a control-
ler.179 The court reasoned that once the decision was made to
provide a service, "the government's employees were required
thereafter to act in a reasonable manner."180
As applied to GPS, it appears that policy decisions, such as the
decision to supply the GPS signal to civil users, are likely to be
discretionary functions.181 The decision to degrade the signal
would also likely be discretionary. 18 2 Once the decision is made
173 Id.
174 346 U.S. 15 (1953); see also Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d
62 (D.C. Cir.) (applying FTCA to negligence of control tower operators), summa-
rily affid sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
'75 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
176 Id. at 36.
177 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
178 Id. at 238.
179 Id.
18o Id. The court also noted that the exception from liability provided for mis-
representations, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), would not apply to the situation where the
claim is based on "the negligent performance of operational tasks." Ingham, 373
F.2d at 239.
181 Cf Spradling, supra note 158, at 49.
182 Cf. id.
1997]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AD COMMERCE
to provide the signal, however, the government undertakes the
obligation of providing reasonable service.'
The second exception to liability considered under the FTCA
denies federal court jurisdiction over any "claim arising in a for-
eign country."18 4 This exception may not provide as much pro-
tection as it would first appear, since interpretation of this
exception allows suits for injuries incurred in foreign countries,
if they result from negligence in the United States. 85 In the
case of GPS, this would imply that any negligence in the provi-
sion of GPS signal occurring within the United States1 6 may
subject the United States to liability, even for injury arising in a
foreign country.18 7
There is also an exception to the F-CA for claims that may be
brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA).' ss Under the
SAA, the United States allows itself to be sued in cases where the
same case could be brought in admiralty against a private per-
son or property.8 9 Hence, the first hurdle a plaintiff must clear
to maintain a suit against the United States under the SAA is to
show that the suit could be brought in admiralty.
The boundaries of maritime jurisdiction were recently re-
viewed by the Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.190 In that case, the Court used the two-
183 Jonathan M. Epstein, Global Positioning System (GPS): Defining the Legal Issues
of Its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1995); see also Spradling, supra
note 158, at 49 (noting that the decision to provide a given level of accuracies
through GPS would likely be discretionary, while errors in providing the signal
may be operational and justify liability).
184 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994).
185 Spradling, supra note 158, at 49.
188 Outer space is even included since that is not "in a foreign country." Id.
187 Id.
188 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (referring to 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752) (1994)). The
exception also allows suit against the United States under the Public Vessels Act,
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (1994). While the distinction between the FTCA and
the SAA, both of which create a cause of action against the United States, may
seem irrelevant, it may actually raise significant differences. For instance, the
SAA has only a two-year statute of limitations, a fact that precluded jurisdiction in
T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975). In that case, the damage done to a privately-owned
vessel by a Sidewinder missile launched from a U.S. Navy aircraft was found to
create an action in admiralty, thus barring any claim under the FTCA. Id. The
court felt that the aircraft's operation by the Navy indicated that "the subject
aircraft is by its very nature maritime." Id. at 857.
189 46 U.S.C. app. § 742.
190 573 U.S. 527 (1995).
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prong test set out in Sisson v. Ruby'9' in determining whether or
not there was maritime jurisdiction. Under the first prong of
that test, a court looks to the location, considering "whether the
tort occurred on navigable water or... was caused by a vessel on
navigable water."192 Under the second prong, a court considers
the connection to traditional maritime activity.' 93 This second
prong is further broken down into two issues. First, the court
considers the type of incident involved, asking whether it has
the potential to disrupt maritime commercial activities. 194 Sec-
ond, the court looks to the character of the incident, question-
ing whether or not there is a "substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity." 9 5
There have been divergent views over the usefulness of the
SAA in aviation cases. It was an aviation case, Executive Jet Avia-
tion, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio,'96 that signaled the departure
from a simple locality test over maritime jurisdiction toward the
relatively complicated two-prong test used in Grubart. Hence,
there is a strong indication that aviation claims are less likely to
find a forum in an admiralty court. On the other hand, Execu-
tive Jet did not completely slam the admiralty door shut against
all aviation claims, since the Court refused to decide whether
any aviation claim could potentially meet the admiralty test
under some circumstances.19 7 In the aftermath of Executive Jet,
several courts have established admiralty jurisdiction over avia-
tion cases.' 98 This may indicate that the SAA may provide access
for suits against the government if the circumstances meet the
Sisson test. It should be noted that the SAA does not contain a
statutory "discretionary function" exception as does the FTCA.
191 497 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1990).
192 Grubart, 573 U.S. at 532 (referring to 46 U.S.C. app. § 740).
'93 Id. at 532.
194 Id.
195 Id. (quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365).
196 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
197 Id. at 271 (refusing to decide whether it would be possible for an aviation
tort to "bear a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity to come
within admiralty jurisdiction").
198 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.) (claim based on
alleged negligence of air traffic controller leading to airplane crash into interna-
tional waters east of Palm Beach, Florida, was within admiralty jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.)
(claim based on alleged negligence of government controllers and rescuers in-
volved in the Flying Tiger Lines cargo plane crash into navigable waters on ap-
proach to Okinawa was within admiralty jurisdiction), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974).
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Nevertheless, this exception has been judicially created where
basic policy judgments are made dealing with the public
interest. 99
Along with judicial relief available under the FTCA and the
SAA, administrative relief may be available for noncombat
claims against the United States government. Under The Mili-
tary Claims Act 2°° and The Foreign Claims Act,2 0 1 the Secretary
of each armed service is authorized to settle claims of up to
$100,000 arising from noncombat damages caused by either a
member of the U.S. armed forces or a civilian employee of the
military department.2 2 Neither of these Acts actually provides a
waiver of sovereign immunity.2 03
3. Liability of the Airspace Users
One additional liability issue is worth consideration. Under
free flight, much of the responsibility for separation of aircraft
will shift from the Air Traffic Service (ATS) providers to the air-
space users. Will this cause any redistribution of liability be-
tween the users and the controllers?
It is likely that free flight will have little effect on the distribu-
tion of liability between ATS providers and pilots. There are sev-
eral reasons for the limited effect. First, even under free flight,
the ATS providers would still be the "ruling entity in separation
arbitration."20 4 In other words, they have the final say over is-
sues regarding separation of aircraft, just as the pilot will have
final responsibility for the safety of his aircraft under both the
199 See, e.g., Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979) (United States
not liable where Coast Guard used its discretion in marking a submerged vessel,
noting that it was a discretionary rather than a mandatory function), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 936 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir. 1976)
(United States not liable for deaths to passengers of motor vessel that had failed
to pass the Coast Guard inspection on the argument that the Coast Guard had
failed "to adopt a comprehensive program of protecting the public from decerti-
fled vessels"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
2N0 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1994), as amended ty Pub. L. No. 104-316 § 202(e), 110
Stat. 3826 (1996).
201 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-316 § 202(e), 110
Stat. 3826 (1996).
202 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (claims not presented regarding damage in foreign coun-
try); 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (claims arising in foreign country).
203 See, e.g., Lloyd's Syndicate 609 v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 998, 1000-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no jurisdiction since the Foreign Claims Act does not
provide a waiver of sovereign immunity); see also Spradling, supra note 158, at 49-
50.
204 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
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existing system 20 5 and under free flight. Thus, the basic ac-
countability concepts underlying the distribution of responsibil-
ity will not be altered.
Second, from a liability perspective, the shift in responsibility
is more a matter of degree than a fundamental change. Numer-
ous examples, including "see and avoid," visual separation, due
regard, and TCAS, currently exist that would form a model for
pilot assumption of additional responsibility for separation of
aircraft.2 0 6 The liability issue during a transition to free flight
will likely draw from these examples rather than impose any
wholesale changes.
V. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED
Many of the impediments to the smooth implementation of
free flight will result from the wide variety of institutions in-
volved. As a result, the road to implementation may have more
political potholes than technological ones.20 7 Some of the diffi-
culties arise because of the perception that there is fragmented
responsibility for providing the navigation signals that would en-
able a transition to free flight. While both the DOT and DOD
typically provide a joint plan for common use navaids,20 the di-
vision of authority with respect to GPS is not evenly divided.
GPS was initially created, tested, instituted, and is currently
operated by the DOD. While it may have been intended as a
predominantly military system, the planned use of the system
was irreversibly changed following the 1983 destruction of Ko-
rean Air Lines (KAL) Flight #007 by a Soviet Union military air-
craft over the Sea ofJapan.2 0 9 That disaster, brought on in part
205 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1996) ("The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly
responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.").
206 See supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
207 See, e.g., R. Michael Baiada, ATC System Biggest Drag on Airline Productivity,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 51 (noting that the technology
already exists for most of the proposed changes and that the major obstacles may
be political and business). Further, money is always a factor as the FAA is facing
tight fiscal constraints. One observer noted that "there is currently zero money
for data link. And if there is no data link, there will be no free flight." Bruce D.
Nordwall, Enabling Free Flight, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 3, 1996, at 28
(quotingJ. Roger Fleming, senior vice president of the Air Transportation Associ-
ation); see also Blattner, supra note 9, at 32 (noting detrimental effect of Budge
Reduction Act on the purchasing of new equipment necessary to implement free
flight technology).
208 See FRP, supra note 38, at 1-1.
2 9 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
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by the navigation errors of the Boeing 747,210 led to President
Reagan's offering of the system for international civilian use.2 11
Planning for the implementation of free flight has been un-
dertaken by numerous institutions in addition to the DOD. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the FAA, for in-
stance, have become involved as key players, with the DOT shar-
ing much of the decision-making process through a joint effort
with the DOD. 12 To make GPS available more widely, addi-
tional institutions become involved in attempting to plan, regu-
late, augment, or improve its use.21 Complicating the issue
somewhat is the continued operational control of the system ex-
clusively by the DOD, including the purposeful degradation of
the system for security purposes.
This fragmented approach to the implementation of GPS for
civil uses leads to some potential conflicts in both domestic and
international forums. In the end, the lack of clear policy sur-
rounding GPS will be seen as the source of some difficulties.
There is a strong need for a coherent policy to guide the numer-
ous institutions involved.
A. DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
As noted above, the implementation of GPS and the transi-
tion to free flight involve the efforts and cooperation of many
domestic institutions. The interplay between the various groups
may lead to conflicts that pose problems to the implementation
of free flight. Some of these issues parallel the issues raised by
the attempt to adapt the limitless opportunities GPS offers to
civil users, without compromising the military benefit that led to
its genesis.
210 Id. at 631.
211 Spradling, supra note 158, at 48.
212 The "DOD and DOT have joint responsibility to avoid unnecessary overlap
or gaps between military and civil radionavigation system and services." FRP,
supra note 38, at 1-23.
213 Currently, within the DOT the primary organizations responsible for navi-
gation aids are the Coast Guard and the FAA, who are respectively responsible for
maritime and aviation applications. Id. at 1-7. In addition to these key players,
however, a plethora of other organizations become involved in the necessary
complex planning. Examples include the Department of Commerce, see gener-
ally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A TECHNICAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF TRANS-
PORTATION ON A NATIONAL APPROACH TO AUGMENTED GPS SERVICES (DEC. 1994),
as well as NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). See FRP, supra note 38, at 4-18 to 19.
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Before examining the interplay between the DOD and the
civil aviation users, we must first examine the involvement of a
group that appears to be a strong advocate of the transition to
free flight-the FAA. To some in the aviation industry, there is
irony in looking to the FAA as the strongest ally in the push to
implement technology.2 14 In recent testimony, William G. Lay-
nor, Chief Technical Advisor of the National Transportation
Safety Board,215 described the FAA's historical response to tech-
nological innovation by telling about an early industry sugges-
tion for the concept of an airborne collision unit. He noted that
the FAA initially claimed to support the concept of the airborne
collision unit when suggested by industry in the late 1960s. 1 6
Despite this early support of an initiative that promised distinct
safety benefits, the FAA did not proceed with full development
of TCAS until after a 1978 collision between a Boeing 727 and a
Cessna near San Diego.2 17 Even then, the concept spent nearly
twenty years in FAA research and development before approval
for installation in transport aircraft.2 1
Despite criticism of the FAA's history of technological pro-
gress, there are many signs of a changed FAA. The involvement
of RTCA is one clear example of an attempt by the FAA to
gather a collection of experts representing the government and
industry in an attempt to define future goals. It should be
noted, however, that for all of RTCA's optimism and thorough
planning, and despite the involvement of FAA personnel in the
process, it is not RTCA who will make the decisions regarding
free flight. It is yet to be seen whether the FAA will act on
RTCA's recommendation of an expeditious transition to the
free flight concept.21 9 Hopefully, the remarks of David Hinson,
214 See, e.g., Industry Perspective of FAA R&D Programs: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Technology of the House Comm. on Science, supra note 71 (testimony of
William G. Laynor, Chief Technical Advisor, Nat'l Transp. Safety Board). ("The
development of an airborne collision avoidance system, and finally the required
installation of the TCAS system, may best exemplify some of the FAA problems in
bringing an R&D program to fruition."); see also id. (statement of J. Roger Flem-
ing) ("Most major system elements are scheduled for operation years after the
airlines believe the capability should be available.").




218 Id. Even then, the system was incorporated without adequate training of
FAA personnel, including air traffic controllers. Id.
219 There are other signs that the FAA is seeking consensus support during the
planning stages for technological progress. In addition to the use of RTCA to
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during his tenure as FAA Administrator, to ATN Systems, Inc.
bear the mark of truth:
This collaborative effort is an example of government/industry
cooperation at its best.... By establishing a clear need for and
strong commitment to the network, and through finding a better
way to work together, the FAA and the aviation industry expect to
... deliver the operational benefits to the airspace users more
quickly.22°
Even if the FAA is a strong proponent of the transition to free
flight, the story is not over. The entire concept depends on a
system under the control of the DOD. GPS is a military innova-
tion, and, even in its civil use it is still controlled by the DOD.
That is not to imply that the DOD has been entirely uncoop-
erative. To make civil use of GPS feasible, the DOD has made
certain availability guarantees.2 2 1 Beyond this, much of the im-
plementation planning is a joint effort between the DOD and
DOT, 222 and both organizations usually characterize decisions as
joint efforts. As one DOD official has said, the decisions are
"made by the U.S. government, not the FAA and not the
military. "223
Nevertheless, these unified governmental decisions regarding
GPS may sound like two preschool siblings reaching a unified
"family" decision. There are occasional signs that the United
States government is not entirely consistent in its policy with re-
spect to GPS. One example occurred in a recent FAA reaction
to a planned Army test evaluating the jamming of GPS signals to
civil aviation users, where one FAA official noted: "If we, the
gain a consensus regarding the overall transition to free flight, the FAA sought
industry consensus in the development of some specifics aspects of technology.
See, e.g., Industry Perspective of FAA R&D Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Technology of the House Comm. on Science, supra note 71 (noting formation of ATN
Systems, Inc. to facilitate consensus development of communications and surveil-
lance systems).
220 Letter from David R. Hinson, Administrator, Fed. Aviation Admin., to Capt.
William B. Cotton, President, ATN Systems, Inc. [hereinafter Hinson Letter to
ATNI, in Industry Perspective of FAA R&D Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Technology of the House Comm. on Science, supra note 72, at attachment B, adden-
dum 2.
221 Including a minimum forty-eight hour notice for any planned disruption of
the GPS signal in peacetime. FRP, supra note 38, at 3-31.
222 See, e.g., FRP, supra note 38, at 1-1 to 3 (noting general joint responsibility
for planning shared by the DOD and the DOT, and specific joint cooperation in
GPS planning).
223 Hale Montgomery, After GPS What?, GPS WORLD, Jan. 1992, at 12 (quoting
Air Force Col. Michael J. Ball, Chief of Airspace and Air Traffic Services).
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FAA, are unable to prevent the disruption to the GPS, our previ-
ous promises to the ICAO community are certainly suspect."
22 4
Incidents like this give credence to the perception that the
United States government is not always acting as a cohesive unit.
Even the concept that one part of the government is spending
vast amounts of money to augment a system that is purposefully
degraded by another part of the government offers some fuel to
this speculation. In a report released in 1995, the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) suggested the deac-
tivation of the degraded GPS signal, noting that many augmen-
tation systems provide accuracies better than the signal with the
selective degradation turned on.225
The fractured governmental approach to GPS policy has
raised the concerns of many. 6 The White House has taken sev-
eral steps toward resolving this fractured governmental ap-
proach to GPS policy. In March 1996, President Clinton issued
a Presidential Decision Directive on GPS.227 That Directive not
only promises to end the GPS selective availability within four to
ten years, but also creates a "GPS Executive Board, jointly
chaired by the DOT and DOD, to coordinate the development
of the GPS system for both military and civilian uses. "228 This
policy may go a long way towards unifying the perception of the
U.S. government's approach to GPS policy.
22
224 Clinton Says U.S. Is Committed to Civil Use of GPS, AEROSPACE DAILY, Mar. 29,
1995, at 475. There are also reports that the FAA's efforts to implement WAAS
have not always been well received by the DOD. See, e.g., GPS Experts Suggest Way
to Avoid Terrorism, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 9, 1995, at 57 (noting that
an agreement was reached that allowed the DOD to selectively jam the WAAS
signal for security concerns); DOD Waffling on WAAS, PROFESSIONAL PILOT, Dec.
1995, at 30.
225 NAPA Study Calls for Phase Out of SA, GLOBAL POSITIONING & NAVIGATION
NEWS, June 1, 1995.
226 See, e.g., id. (calling for adoption of "explicit" goals in GPS policy making);
Rand Report: U.S. Needs New, Clearer GPS Policy Statement, SATELLITE WK., Feb. 5,
1996, available in 1996 WL 7054277 (hereinafter Rand Report] (noting the lack of
clear U.S. GPS policy).
227 Clinton Policy Opens GPS Accuracy to Civil Users, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 1, 1996,
at 3.
228 Id.
2N See, e.g., Clinton Administration Making GPS Accuracy Available to Civil Users,
WEEKLY BUSINESS AVIATION, Apr. 8, 1996 (quoting Secretary of Transportation
Pna as saying that the policy "gives everyone, including the global community,
greater confidence that this is available and will be made available even further in
the future"); Calvin Biesecker, Clinton Policy Keeps GPS Service Free for All Users,
DEFENSE DAILY, Apr. 1, 1996 (quoting Randy Hoffman, president Magellan Sys-
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B. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
To fully implement free flight, the international aviation com-
munity will have to adopt unified operating standards. At this
time, it is unknown what standards will be adopted or how they
will be determined. The United States has offered GPS as the
navigation signal of choice and is further seeking to take a lead-
ership role in determining other standards to be used in imple-
menting free flight. This raises two concerns in the
international scene. First, the credibility of the United States is
questioned when it puts its ambiguous GPS policy on display to
the world. Second, even if the policy of the United States was
clear, there are international doubts about the motives underly-
ing the United States' offers.
Looking at the first issue, there is international concern over
excessive dependance on a system, such as GPS, that is subject to
the control of one government. This discomfort comes despite
assurances from the U.S. government that the signals will be
continuous and is based in part on the view that U.S. policy in
this area is schizophrenic. The international community sees an
intragovernmental dispute between different organizations of
the U.S. government, with some, such as the FAA, promising
continuity of the signal, while others, such as the DOD, offer less
enthusiastic assurance. This concern is summarized by worries
of overdependence on a system "owned and operated by the
Pentagon."230 Time will tell whether the recently issued presi-
dential GPS policy will assuage these international concerns
about the future availability of GPS.
The second issue concerns the international perception of
the United States' motives for taking the leadership role in im-
tems Corp. as saying that the new policy "provides a solid foundation- for people
to feel comfortable about using and investing in GPS for the long-term").
230 Editorial: Time for Action on Global Navsat, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug.
2, 1993, at 70 (quoting John Beukers). The recently released Final Report of the
Gore Commission noted that "[m]any other nations.... are reluctant to base
their own airspace management on a GPS system which they perceive to be con-
trolled by the U.S. military." FINAL REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON
AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY 2.4 [hereinafter GORE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT].
Copies of the Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Secur-
ity can be accessed on-line at www.aviationcommission.dot.gov. One of the re-
port's recommendations was "that civilian leadership be strengthened by
establishing a Civil GPS Users Advisory Council to report to the GPS Executive
Board." Id. The commission was created by President Clinton to advise "the
President on matters involving aviation safety and security, including air traffic
control." Exec. Order No. 13,015 § 2(a), 61 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1996).
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plementing GPS and free flight. A review of the efforts of the
United States to further the international effort is in order.
The United States' international commitment to GPS was first
expressed in September 1991 byJames B. Busey, then FAA Ad-
ministrator, at the Air Navigation Conference (ANC) in Mon-
treal "when he committed the United States to providing GPS
standard positioning services free for 10 years past the system's
operational date, or until about 2003."s231 This commitment was
later reiterated to the ICAO by President Clinton, who said the
United States "remains committed to provide Global Positioning
System signals to the international civil aviation community and
to other peaceful users of radio navigation and positioning
systems."232
Just as the United States would like to set the standard for
world navigation with GPS, the United States would also like to
lead the way in setting international operational and equipment
standards for implementation of free flight.2 33 Such efforts are
necessary for the major restructuring envisioned during the
transition to satellite-based technology.23 4 The FAA envisions
development of the worldwide communications network's stan-
dards necessary for free flight,2 3 5 and at the 1995 Paris Air Show,
FAA Administrator David Hinson expressed the United States'
desires for international agreement on setting these common
standards. 6
Despite these U.S. government assurances to provide the GPS
signal and to cooperate in defining the future of free flight,
much of the world is not convinced that the United States is
acting altruistically. The fear is that the United States may be
acting to "discourage foreign competition" and to keep the sat-
231 Montgomery, supra note 223, at 12. In return, Glonass was offered by the
"Soviets" until 2010. Id.
232 Clinton Says U.S. Is Committed to Civil Use of GPS, supra note 224, at 475 (quot-
ing letter to ICAO).
233 Although RTCA's primary focus was domestic free flight, they recognized
the value of worldwide acceptance of the concept. TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra
note 1, at 133. One of the recommendations by RTCA was to encourage interna-
tional participation in the steering committee that further examines free flight.
Nordwall, supra note 2, at 34.
234 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 133.
235 Cf Hinson Letter to ATN, supra note 220.
236 Hinson Calls for Worldwide ATC Structure, AIR SAFETY WEEK, June 26, 1995.
This echoes the recommendation of the Rand Report, supra note 226, advocating
that U.S. policy promote the use of GPS as the global standard, to be provided
free of user charges. Id.
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ellite system under U.S. control.23 7  Even the efforts of the
United States to seek common standards is subject to a contrast-
ing international view since the initial effort involved eleven U.S.
airlines.23 8 The view of the rest of the world may have been ac-
curately summarized by European space officials who have ex-
pressed concerns that U.S. offers are "an attempt to thwart
European initiative and undercut competing satellite, space and
communications technologies." 23 9
The United States has noted these international concerns24
and is attempting to address them. The FAA characterizes its
leadership towards free flight as support of the ICAO Communi-
cation, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management
(CNS/ATM) concept.2 41 Indeed, there is evidence of U.S. solici-
tation of international support for advancement of technology
in the field.242
237 Id. (quoting recommendation of the Rand Report, supra note 226).
238 Cf Hinson Letter to ATN, supra note 220. The airlines involved in ATN
Systems, Inc. are Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, American Trans Air, Conti-
nental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Federal Express, Hawaiian Airlines, Northwest Air-
lines, United Airlines, United Parcel Service, and USAir. Industry Perspective of
FAA R&D Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technology of the House Comm.
on Science, supra note 71, at attachment B.
239 BarryJames, Fliers Wary of U.S. Offer, INT'L HERALD TIUB., June 13, 1995, at
15. George Donohue, FAA Associate Administrator, summarized European senti-
ment that FAA advocation of GPS as the international navigation instrument
amounted to "technological imperialism." FAA Pitch, AVIATION WE. & SPACE
TECH.,July 10, 1995, at 21.
240 See, e.g., FAA Blueprints Worldwide Airspace System; Expects WAAS Awarded This
Month, WKLV. Bus. AVIATION, July 17, 1995, at 26 (noting comments of George
Donohue, FAA Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions, that some
nations are apprehensive about the U.S. movement toward GPS and other satel-
lite technologies, and that some foreign carriers are concerned about the poten-
tial for a U.S.-led technology providing advantages to U.S. carriers).
241 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP./FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGE:
GLOBAL AVIATION FOR THE 21sT CENTURY INTRODUCTION (1993).
242 See, e.g., John Martel, Japanese MTSAT to be First WAAS Compatible System in
Asia/Pacific Region, SATNAV NEWS, Dec. 1995, at 1 (highlighting efforts to insure a
seamless interface between FAA's WAAS and the Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau's
Multi-Function Transport Satellite (MTSAT) Navigation Service); Amy Bellay,
U.S.-Iceland Agreement Nears Completion, SATNAV NEWS, Dec. 1995, at 6 (highlight-
ing imminent agreement for investigation of WAAS in northern latitudes).
Other signs of U.S. efforts to secure international cooperation are evident. For
instance, the U.S. has encouraged Persian Gulf nations to establish a wide-area
differential system through a cooperative effort. Paul Mann, Gulf Nations Weigh
Joint GPS Effort, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 27, 1995, at 40. Additional
international movement is evident by the planned installation of a local area dif-
ferential GPS ground station at the Lugano airport in Switzerland. Interstate Elec-
tronics Corp., AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 16, 1995, at 56 (Bruce D.
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One suggested solution to quell international fears would be
to provide for ownership and operation of GNSS by the Interna-
tional Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) .24S This
would be a very unlikely occurrence, at least as far as the United
States GPS system is concerned. However, to offset some inter-
national concerns, Mr. Hinson has indicated that some systems
could be administered by ICAO.2 "
Whether the United States is seeking to assert dominance
over the technologies necessary for future air transportation,
whether it is merely assuming the necessary leadership role by
default, or whether it is acting as a reluctant partner in an indus-
try-led drive remains to be seen. Whatever the role of the U.S.,
great economic and safety benefits will accrue from the imple-
mentation of such widespread changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a technological viewpoint, the transition to free flight is
already underway. The chief obstacles will be institutional. To
some extent, the political problems will stem from what appears
to be a fragmented United States policy on the use of GPS.
This, combined with international fears that may view U.S. lead-
ership on the issue as being an attempt to "corner the market,"
may create impediments to free flight implementation. Despite
this, the transition to free flight will be benefit driven.2 4 Ulti-
mately, the value of the system, to the airspace users as well as to
the governments that provide the already overburdened conven-
tional flight services, will outweigh any serious criticism of the
system.
To avoid vindicated charges of trying to dominate the field,
the transition will be largely guided by ICAO policies and should
involve extensive international cooperation. Nevertheless, the
leadership of the United States is still necessary to act as a driv-
ing force toward the economic and safety benefits that free
flight may promise.
Nordwall, ed.). Several countries have already accepted GPS as a supplemental
en route navigation aid. FAA Region Examining GPS Direct Flights' Impact, Proce-
dures, AVIATION DAILY, July 30, 1996, at 161 (including Argentina, Australia, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chile, Fiji, Germany, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Peru, South Africa,
and Uruguay).
243 Air Transportation Defense Departments Reach Accord on GPS Use, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Jan. 3, 1994, at 32.
244 James, supra note 239, at 15.
245 TASK FORCE 3 REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
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Will the transition to free flight be fast enough to take advan-
tage of these economic and safety benefits? Maybe not. The
just-issued Gore Commission Final Report notes the inadequa-
cies of the current FAA goal of national airspace modernization
by the year 2012.246 The Commission recommends an acceler-
ated deadline of 2005 for implementation of "all elements of the
communication, navigation, and surveillance and air traffic
management capabilities."2 47 One major test of whether such a
goal is feasible will begin in 1999. That is when the first "com-
plete operational system evaluation" will be conducted during a
two-year test of free flight for aircraft in Hawaii, Alaska, and in
between.248
246 GORE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 2.1.
247 Id.
248 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Fact Sheet Ha-Laska Free Flight Demonstration Projec
News Release, Jan. 15, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 38108. This will re-
quire a complete upgrade of the ground systems in both states and the equipping
of about 2000 aircraft. Id.
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